STATE OF MONTANA
BEFORE THE BOARD
OF PERSONNEL APPEALS
IN THE MATTER OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE NO. 6-2001:
INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF OPERATING |
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ENGINEERS, LOCAL NO. 400,
AFL-CIO, |
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Complainant, |
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FINDINGS OF FACT;
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vs. |
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW;
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AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
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FERGUS COUNTY, MONTANA, |
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Defendant. |
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I. INTRODUCTION
The International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 400 filed this charge against Fergus
County on January 8, 2001. The matter was investigated by Board of Personnel
Appeals investigator Michael Bentley, and on March 1, 2001, Bentley concluded
that there was probable merit for the charge. A telephone pre-hearing conference
was held on April 11, 2001. The hearing was held on June 21, 2001 in the
Fergus County Courthouse in Lewistown, Montana.
The Complainant, International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 400, AFL-CIO, was represented by its attorney, Karl J.
Englund. Fergus County was represented by Richard L. Larsen. Prior to taking
any evidence or testimony, the Union moved that the allegations made in
the complaint be deemed admitted by the County because of the County's failure
to file the required answer. Fergus County stipulated that it had not filed
an answer pursuant to § 39-31-405(4), MCA. The Hearing Officer denied
the motion orally because the Union prosecuted the matter throughout the
course of the proceeding without any claimed prejudice, and because the
Union failed to present that matter as an issue prior to the hearing. The
hearing proceeded. Each side was given the opportunity to call witnesses,
introduce exhibits, and cross-examine the witnesses called by the other.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties waived oral closing arguments
and agreed to file post-hearing proposed findings and conclusions to be
postmarked July 19, 2001. The record was deemed fully submitted and ready
for decision on July 23, 2001.
Exhibits 1 through 5, DE-1 through DE-6, and
E-1 through E-16 were admitted into the record without objections.
II. ISSUE
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
IV. DISCUSSION
Montana requires a public employer to bargain
collectively in good faith with labor organizations representing its employees
on issues of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment.
§ 39-31-301(5), MCA. The failure to bargain collectively in good faith
is a violation of §39-31-401(5), MCA.
The Montana Supreme Court has approved the
practice of the Board of Personnel Appeals in using federal court and National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent as guidance in interpreting the Montana
Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act. State ex rel. Board of
Personnel Appeals v. District Court, 183 Mont. 223, 598 P.2d 1117, (1979);
Teamsters Local No. 45 v. State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals,
195 Mont. 272, 635 P.2d 1310 (1981); City of Great Falls v. Young
(Young III), 211 Mont. 13, 686 P.2d 185 (1984).
It is firmly established that an employer
violates its duty to bargain in good faith when it makes unilateral changes
in wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment during the course
of collective bargaining. This was explained by the court in NLRB v.
McClatchy Newspapers, 964 F.2d 1153, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1992):
A unilateral change not only violates the plain requirement that the parties bargain over "wages, hours and other terms and conditions" but also injures the process of collective bargaining itself. Such unilateral action minimizes the influence of organized bargaining. It interferes with the right to self organization by emphasizing to the employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agreement.
The Union also contends that when a union is certified, the employer must maintain the status quo during the course of negotiations, and cites NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) in support of its position. The Union believes that the status quo is the structure of wages and benefits that existed prior to the union certification, and Fergus County must continue to treat unit employees the same as it treated other non-union County employees during the course of bargaining. Failure to do so, under the Union's theory, is inconsistent with past practice. It cites NLRB v. Allied Products Corp., 548 F.2d. 644, 653 (6th Cir. 1977), where the employer unilaterally discontinued merit pay increases which were fixed as to timing but discretionary in amount in support of its position. In holding that the employer had violated its duty to bargain in good faith, the Court stated:
The Act is violated by a unilateral change in the existing wage structure whether that change be an increase or the denial of a scheduled increase.
Here, however,
it is clear that Fergus County did not always follow a set structure. The
County did not have an existing wage structure which called for raises in
September 2000. All raises were at the discretion of the County in setting
the FY2001 budget. As recently as 1995, Fergus County made it clear in negotiations
with the MPEA that only upon final agreement and signing of the contract
would the bargaining unit receive the benefits agreed to by the parties.
That agreement became effective July 31, 1995, and contained an agreed-to
wage package, which was not effective until October 1, 1995.
The court explained the effects of unilateral
change and its relationship to past practices in NLRB v. McClatchy Newspapers,
964 F.2d 1153, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1992):
Unilateral change doctrine is the basis for the related past practices doctrine. Under the past practices rule, an employer and union who are bargaining without a collective bargaining agreement in effect generally must maintain the status quo with regard to mandatory subjects of bargaining. However, where the employer has had unilateral discretion over a mandatory subject, the employer cannot continue to exercise that discretion without prior notice to the union. For example, an employer may not continue granting discretionary merit pay raises, even if the review process has become customary and itself must be continued. (McClatchy at 1162-1163)
In this case,
the court's holding that an employer acts lawfully in granting a union a
lesser than requested wage increase during negotiations is persuasive. Where
there has been a history of good faith bargaining and the employer notified
the union and its employees, no refusal to bargain existed. NLRB v. Bradley
Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Stone Container
Corp., 313 NLRB No. 22 (1993), which held that even though the employer
had an established practice of giving annual wage increases, it acted lawfully
in failing to grant them during contract negotiations. The employer continued
to bargain over the increase and discussed it while the union had agreed
to prospectively accept an increase.
Further, in Peabody Coal Co. v. NLRB,
725 F.2d 357, 115 LRRM (6th Cir. 1984), the board held that although an
employer withheld wage increases from recently unionized clerks that other
similarly situated clerks of the same employer received, there was no refusal
to bargain or any change in terms and conditions of employment.
In addition, the NLRB has held: "Absent
an unlawful motive, an employer is privileged to give wage increases to
his unorganized employees, at a time when his other employees are seeking
to bargain collectively through a statutory representative. Likewise, an
employer is under no obligation under the Act to make such wage increases
applicable to union members, in face of collective bargaining negotiations
on their behalf involving much higher stakes." Empire Pacific Industries,
Inc., 257 NLRB 1425 (1981).
As the Supreme Court made clear in American
Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 58 LRRM 2672 (1965), the Act
accords employees no right to insist upon their bargaining demands free
from economic disadvantages, and an employer's use of economic pressures
solely in support of a bargaining position cannot be held unlawful for that
reason alone.
In examining the regularity of the practice,
it appears Fergus County has generally withheld the granting of pay increases
to bargaining unit employees until parties reached a final written contract
incorporating the agreement reached. The contract would then establish the
wages and benefits agreed upon and the effective date. That was the practice
with the Sheriff's bargaining unit and the previous Bridge Department bargaining
unit. Here, the record does not show that Fergus County unilaterally changed
an existing wage structure in the course of bargaining. The County essentially
followed the same pattern and practice as they had in the past.
V. CONCLUSION OF LAW
1. Fergus County did not violate §§ 39?31?401(1) and (5), MCA,
as charged by Complainant.
VI. RECOMMENDED ORDER
Unfair Labor Practice Charge No. 1435-2001 is dismissed.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2001.
BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS
By: /s/ GORDON D. BRUCE
GORDON D. BRUCE
Hearing Officer
NOTICE: Exceptions to these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended
Order may be filed pursuant to ARM 24.26.215 within 20 days after the day
the decision of the hearing officer is mailed, as set forth in the certificate
of service below. If no exceptions are timely filed, this Recommended Order
shall become the Final Order of the Board of Personnel Appeals. § 39-31-406(6),
MCA. Notice of Exceptions must be in writing, setting forth with specificity
the errors asserted in the proposed decision and the issues raised by the
exceptions, and shall be mailed to:
Board of Personnel Appeals
Department of Labor and Industry
P.O. Box 6518
Helena, MT 59624-6518